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The European Commission is currently conducting an inquiry into judicial and media reforms
introduced by the Law and Justice government in Poland. Aleks Szczerbiak analyses the way in
which this investigation is going to aﬀect the political dynamics within the country, and argues that
the oﬀensive against the ruling party’s policies may well prove to be a double-edged sword for the
Polish opposition. 
Poland’s right-wing government found itself on the defensive last month following the European
Commission’s unprecedented decision to initiate an investigation under the EU’s ‘rule of law’
mechanism. An ongoing row with the Commission will be debilitating for the government which will have to spend
valuable time and political capital defending its reputation in the European arena. However, the ruling party has
shown that it can ﬁght its corner and the Commission’s intervention could prove a double-edged sword for Poland’s
opposition.
Law and Justice on the back-foot
The Polish government – led, since last October’s parliamentary election, by the right-wing Law and Justice (PiS)
party – found itself on the back-foot last month following the European Commission’s surprising decision to initiate a
preliminary investigation of the country under the EU’s so-called ‘rule of law’ monitoring mechanism.
In 2014, the Union adopted the instrument, intended to address ‘systemic’ breaches of the rule of law and EU
principles in any member state. It was meant to complement the so-called ‘nuclear option’ provision in Article 7 of
the EU treaties that allows the European Council to impose sanctions on countries found to be in serious and
persistent breach of fundamental EU values; in the worst-case scenario, suspending their voting rights. So far the
Commission has agreed to the ﬁrst step under the framework which involves undertaking a preliminary investigation
of whether or not there are clear indications of a ‘systemic threat to the rule of law’ and initiating a dialogue with the
member state concerned.
This unprecedented move came in response to concerns about recent actions by the Law and Justice government
in relation to the membership and functioning of Poland’s constitutional tribunal, a powerful body that rules on the
constitutionality of laws, and a new media law passed by the Polish parliament in January.
The government’s critics accuse it of undermining the fundamentals of Polish democracy and the rule of law by:
ignoring the tribunal’s rulings on the constitutiality of a law determining the body’s membership and trying to curb its
power to place checks on the government, as well as placing public broadcasting under direct government control.
These actions, they argue, represent attempts to interfere in the independence of the judiciary and put Law and
Justice party loyalists in charge of state TV and radio.
Beata Szydło’s counter-oﬀensive
Law and Justice tried to regain the initiative by undertaking a (somewhat belated) public relations oﬀensive aimed at
improving Poland’s image within the EU institutions; re-assuring European leaders of the government’s broadly pro-
EU attitude and that it was committed to upholding the rule of law and European values.
The government’s supporters defended its actions as necessary measures to restore pluralism and balance to state
institutions that they say had been colonised by supporters of, and milieu associated with, the centrist Civic Platform
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Polish Prime Minister Beata Szydło in EP plenary debating the situation in
Poland. Credits: European Parliament / Flickr
(PO) grouping, the previous governing party. More
broadly, they argued that many Polish institutions
have been expropriated by an extremely well-
entrenched, and often deeply corrupt, post-
communist elite and claimed that opposition to the
government was being orchestrated by political
forces unable to come to terms with their electoral
defeat and vested interests hostile to its plans to
radically reconstruct the state and introduce
sweeping socio-economic reforms.
The centrepiece of Law and Justice’s counter-
oﬀensive was (what even the government’s critics
admitted was) an eﬀective intervention by prime
minister Beata Szydło in a European Parliament
plenary debate on the political situation in Poland
held in the week after the Commission’s decision was
announced.
Although Mrs Szydło’s critics accused her of being
evasive and misleading in responding to the Commission’s concerns, in a calm and conciliatory performance she
tried to de-escalate the dispute: insisting that the Polish government was open to dialogue and would co-operate to
patiently answer all of the criticisms. However, Mrs Szydło did not make any substantial concessions arguing that
the constitutional tribunal dispute was an internal matter of a political rather than legal nature for Poland to solve on
its own, and that the government’s changes to public broadcasting conformed to European standards.
Earlier, she tried to undercut the Commission’s arguments by organising consultations with opposition leaders, for
the ﬁrst time since the new government took oﬃce last November, to ﬁnd a compromise solution to the constitutional
tribunal deadlock (unsuccessfully, as it turned out). The EP debate was also preceded by a visit to Brussels by Law
and Justice-backed President Andrzej Duda who tried to lower the emotional temperature of the debate by meeting,
and holding a (generally good natured) joint press conference, with EU Council President and former Civic Platform
prime minister Donald Tusk.
Law and Justice was helped greatly by the weak performance in the EP debate of Civic Platform, now the main
opposition grouping. The Polish opposition enjoys close links with the EU political establishment and Western
opinion forming media, many of whom share their dislike of Law and Justice, so it was assumed that the EP debate
would be favourable territory for the party. Indeed, during party leadership election hustings with local activists, Civic
Platform’s new leader Grzegorz Schetyna (who was elected unopposed at the end of January) identiﬁed utilising the
European arena as a key element of the opposition’s anti-government strategy.
However, the party was divided over which tactics to pursue in the EP debate: anxious to capitalise on the
government’s diﬃculties, but fearful of leaving itself open to criticism that it was weakening the country’s
international standing by using a European forum to air domestic political grievances. In the event, except for one
brief intervention from a Civic Platform MEP, the party eﬀectively sat out the debate and ended up with the worst of
both worlds: apparently supporting the Commission intervention but only half-heartedly. 
The EU intervention could drag on
In fact, the Commission has no powers to impose sanctions on Poland as the ‘rule of law’ framework only constitutes
a political dialogue without any legally binding recommendations. These can only arise if the Commission proposes
them to the EU Council under Article 7 where they require unanimity in one of the three stages of voting; and the
Hungarian government has already made it clear that it will veto any attempt to introduce such measures.
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But Mrs Szydło’s eﬀective EP performance – and, more broadly, Law and Justice’s public relations counter-oﬀensive
– have not ended the conﬂict between the Commission and Poland. While the government is keen to move political
debate back on to ‘normal’ socio-economic issues, where Law and Justice feels it is more in tune with public opinion
than its liberal and centrist opponents, the Commission’s ‘rule of law’ investigation process could be a lengthy one,
potentially forcing the Polish ruling party to spend valuable time and political capital responding to criticisms and
defending its position in the European and international arena.
The Commission has said that it will return to the issue in March after the Venice Commission, an advisory body of
the Council of Europe (a non-EU organisation which aims to uphold democracy and the rule of law), issues an
opinion on Poland’s constitutional tribunal reforms. If the matter is not resolved by then, the Commission can issue a
‘rule of law recommendation’ giving Poland a speciﬁc time period to address the problems it has identiﬁed. If it still
considers that the problem has not been dealt with to its satisfaction, the Commission can then recommend the
invocation of Article 7.
At the same time, the constitutional tribunal crisis looks set to rumble on with most of Poland’s opposition parties
rejecting a government proposal to resolve the crisis by replacing the tribunal’s membership with eight judges
nominated by the opposition and seven by the ruling party. It could also re-surface as a major issue of contention
this month when the tribunal expects to rule on the constitutionality of amendments to the law determining its
functioning passed by the Polish parliament at the end of December; which the government argues has already
come into force and the tribunal has no power to review.
How will Poles react?
At this stage, it is diﬃcult to tell how Poles will react to any further EU interventions. On the one hand, many of them
are quite sensitive to international opinion, and understandably wary of anything that might lead to the country losing
inﬂuence which could make it more diﬃcult for Poland to promote its interests within the EU.
Not only do Poles still support their country’s EU membership overwhelmingly, but one of Law and Justice’s
opponents’ most eﬀective criticisms of the previous 2005-7 party-led administration was that it had isolated Poland
within EU institutions by alienating the main European powers, particularly Germany, and created the perception of
the country as an unreliable and unstable EU member. This charge was strongly rejected by Law and Justice
supporters who, for their part, argued that it was the previous Civic Platform-led government that failed to advance
Poland’s interests eﬀectively within the EU in spite of locating the country squarely within the so-called ‘European
mainstream’ and enjoying extremely close relations with Berlin.
Moreover, notwithstanding the potential threat that isolation within the EU might pose to Poland’s tangible, material
interests, at a more abstract level many Poles may feel particularly uneasy about the charge that the Law and
Justice government is undermining so-called European values. This is because one of the key motivations for Poles
voting overwhelmingly to join the EU in a 2003 accession referendum, and main reasons why levels of popular
support for the country’s EU membership have remained so high, was the idea that joining the Union represented a
historical and civilisational choice: a symbolic re-uniting of Poland with a Western international community of shared
values that they had always considered themselves to be part of culturally and spiritually.
And yet, although most Poles remain broadly pro-EU, they also value their national independence and are likely to
react instinctively against the idea of foreign interference in their domestic aﬀairs. Moreover, as last month’s events
have shown, Law and Justice will ﬁght its corner in the European arena, so a heavy-handed EU intervention could
simply allow the party to present itself as the defender of Polish sovereignty against unwarranted meddling by
arrogant Brussels oﬃcials.
Moreover, the idea of Polish EU membership as representing a ‘civilisational choice’ has been undermined in recent
years by an increasing sense of cultural distinctiveness that many Poles feel towards Western Europe. This has
been particularly evident in the sphere of moral-cultural values where Polish attachment to traditional morality and
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national identity stands in stark contrast to the socially liberal, cosmopolitan consensus that predominates among
West European political and cultural elites.
This issue has surfaced recently in the contrasting reactions of Poles (and other Central Europeans) and West
European political elites (although not necessarily their publics) to the European migration crisis. Poles are keen to
avoid the kind of cultural and security problems that many of them feel West European countries have experienced
through admitting large numbers of Muslim migrants who are seen as diﬃcult to assimilate and embedding violent
extremists within their communities.
Indeed, one Law and Justice response to the Commission’s ‘rule of law’ investigation was that the EU should be
concerning itself more with addressing the fall-out from the migration crisis than the political situation in Poland. In
other words, it not as obvious as it once was – and, arguably, becoming less so – that the ‘civilizational choices’ that
are being made by political and cultural elites in other parts of the continent are the same ones that Poles want to
make. The ‘European card’ is, therefore, one that the government’s opponents need to play with great caution and
could easily backﬁre on them.
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